Inefficiencies and opportunities of urban transport in Brazil: a cas= e study of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA

Artigos Originais

Inefficiencies and opportunities of urban tran= sport in Brazil: a case study of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA

Inefici=EAncias e oportunidades do = transporte urbano no Brasil, um estudo de caso de Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA

Ineficiencias y oportunidades del t= ransporte urbano en Brasil, un estudio de caso de Balneario Cambori=FA

Vinicius Tische= r ¹

Universidade do Vale do Itaja=ED, Brasil

Inefficiencies and opportunities of urban transport = in Brazil: a case study of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA

MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law= and Economics, vol. 1= 0, e2022101411, 2022

Instituto Ludwig von Mises - Brasil

Received: 23 June 2021

Accepted: 03 August 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.3080= 0/mises.2022.v10.1411

ABSTRACT: This resea= rch tries to identify the institutional and legal critical factors responsi= ble for the inefficiencies in the urban mobility system in Brazil, suggesti= ng later guidelines on how to overcome counterproductive conditions of the = transport system. We reviewed the literature and legislation related to urb= an mobility applied to Brazilian cities using the city of Balne=E1rio Cambo= ri=FA, Brazil, as a case study. The analysis allowed us to understand sever= al factors that can generate negative externalities and reduce the urban mo= bility of the urban population. In conclusion, we identified that the ineff= iciencies, especially for public transportation, face several legal and ins= titutional issues, where interventionist policies do not allow the best sol= utions to be employed.

Keyword: Transport policy, urban mob= ility, transit, public transport in developing countries, institutional, le= gal issues of transportation..

RESUMO: O objetivo = dessa pesquisa =E9 identificar os fatores institucionais e legais, respons= =E1veis pelas inefici=EAncias no sistema de mobilidade urbana no Brasil, su= gerindo medidas para superar as condi=E7=F5es contraproducentes do sistema = de transporte. Revisamos a literatura e a legisla=E7=E3o relacionadas com a= mobilidade urbana, aplicadas =E0s cidades brasileiras utilizando como caso= de estudo a cidade de Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA, no Brasil. Essa an=E1lise pe= rmitiu compreender v=E1rios fatores que podem gerar externalidades negativa= s e reduzir a mobilidade urbana da popula=E7=E3o urbana. Dentre os resultad= os, identificamos que as inefici=EAncias, especialmente no transporte p=FAb= lico, enfrentam v=E1rios problemas legais e institucionais, em que suas pol= =EDticas intervencionistas n=E3o permitem a ado=E7=E3o das melhores solu=E7= =F5es.

Palavras-chave: pol=EDtica de transp= orte, mobilidade urbana, tr=E2nsito, transporte p=FAblico em pa=EDses em de= senvolvimento, quest=F5es institucionais, legais do transporte..

RESUMEN: El objetivo= de esta investigaci=F3n es identificar los factores cr=EDticos institucion= ales y legales responsables por las ineficiencias en el sistema de movilida= d urbana en Brasil, para luego recomendar pautas sobre c=F3mo superar las c= ondiciones contraproducentes del sistema de transporte. Se revis=F3 la lite= ratura y la legislaci=F3n relacionada con la movilidad urbana aplicada a la= s ciudades brasile=F1as utilizando como caso de estudio la ciudad de Balnea= rio Cambori=FA, Brasil. El an=E1lisis permiti=F3 comprender varios factores= que pueden generar externalidades negativas y reducci=F3n de la movilidad = urbana de la poblaci=F3n urbana. Como principales resultados, se identific= =F3 que las ineficiencias, especialmente para el transporte p=FAblico, enfr= entan varios problemas legales e institucionales, donde sus pol=EDticas int= ervencionistas no permiten que se empleen las mejores soluciones.

Palabras clave: pol=EDtica de transp= orte, movilidad urbana, tr=E1nsito, transporte p=FAblico en pa=EDses en des= arrollo, cuestiones institucionales, legales del transporte..

INTRODUCTION

The approach of urban mobility in the Brazilian academ= ic context is sometimes superficial and attached to pre-conceived platitude= s, suggesting solutions with little practical impact, precisely because it = does not fully identify the real causes of the inefficiencies of the Transp= ort and Urban Mobility System (TUMS) in the country. As a result, they fail= to address precisely the problems. However, the inefficiencies are far mor= e underlying and complex than commonly proclaimed: lack of urban planning; = lack of inspection; dishonest companies or governments.

An inaccurate identification of the problem is a relev= ant matter since usually has been the basis for several public policies whi= ch delegate to the State the obligation to provide services in a centralize= d way, limiting private initiative action, and promotes functional economic= monopolies of public transport operation. As a result, public transport oc= curs with competition distortions, with an outcome where transit system has= low participation in ridership (compared to the automobile) reducing their= use. That, associated with policies that foster the use of cars results in= an imbalance between supply and demand between modes of transport.

Problems arise from this, whereby, initially, the cent= ral authority (through representatives and specialists/technicians) would h= ave the competence to satisfactorily determine all component parameters of = transport planning, in coordination with the other intersectoral policies o= f a city; and all this to be carried out efficiently and capable of making = urban transport competitive with private cars.

Public transport services, however, are not effective,= operating with low productivity and efficiency, uncomfortable, not conveni= ent and with low competitiveness in relation to cars (SAMPAIO et al., 2006= ; BE= RTUSSY; ELLERY, 2012; PERO; STEFANELLI, 2015). As a result, there is a= worsening in urban mobility quality, and the population has in the car the= most suitable alternative to their needs.

This process contributes to the generation of severe e= xternalities: increasing car traffic (ABDALA; PASQUALETTO, 2013), generatin= g negative environmental and public health impacts (SILVA, 2013), such as = noise (PISONI, 2019; WANN-MING, 2018) and air pollution (MRKAJ=CDC; ANGUE= LOVSKI, 2016; JIMENEZ-VACA, 2020), reduce the competitiveness of cities, a= nd restricts the general accessibility of the population. Also, Litman (2008; 2014) points out that ineffective public transport, especially in emer= ging countries, also increases the risks of transport accidents, while ther= e is a negative correlation being verified between the increase in public t= ransport trips, with the lowest incidence of serious accidents. In Brazil, = high rates in traffic accidents can be verified specially in more vulnerabl= e users (pedestrians, cyclists, and motorcyclists) (MELLO; PORTUGAL, 2017)= .

As responses to these negative impacts, public policie= s for territorial ordering and urban mobility were implemented in Brazil: T= he Federal Urban Policy (Law 10.257/2001, in Brazil (2001)) and the Federa= l Urban Mobility Policy (Law 12.587/2012: Brazil (2012)). These polices, a= nd its complementary laws, establishes guidelines in order to achieve const= itutional guarantees: =93right to efficient urban mobility=94 and =93full d= evelopment of the city's social functions and to guarantee the well-being o= f its inhabitants=94 (Art. 144 and Art. 182 of the Brazilian Constitution: = Braz= il (1988)). In addition to federal laws, municipal laws establish speci= al conditions for local issues, such as urban legislation (City Master Plan= , concession and regulation of local transport), besides regulations result= ing from Municipal or State Governments (Table 1= ).

Table 1.

Examples of the main current transport and ur= ban mobility laws in Brazil

Source: the author.

BRAZIL REALITY

In Brazil, the provision of urban transport services i= s a competence of the municipal authority (BRAZIL, 1988). The Municipality = (local authority) can perform direct provision or adjudicate to the private= sector. In theory, this would allow for greater local autonomy; however, t= he competition occurs only in the concession bidding process, and the marke= t exploit is an exclusive entitled to the transportation company. Consequen= tly, free-market competition is prevented.

Ida= and Talit (2015) highlight problems in this process, such as the lack = of information and transparency in the bidding process, in addition to the = lack of autonomy for transport service providers (low participation of oper= ators at the tacit level, e.g., determination of routes, tariffs, frequency= ) Due to the high degree of intervention, the productivity of public transp= ortation is compromised, besides the increase in bureaucracy that makes the= system more prone to shady political objectives (CURRIE, 2016).

That being so, the purpose of this research is to iden= tify the institutional and legal neuralgic points responsible for the ineff= iciencies in the urban mobility system in Brazil, to later recommend propos= e guidelines on how to overcome counterproductive conditions, in order to r= educe the externalities and improve urban mobility and the quality of life = of the population. This research is not intended to characterize a desirabl= e city, or ideal model (central planning) to be implemented through ad hoc = rational evaluation. It has the scope to generate discussion about guidelin= es that can reduce transport inefficiencies of urban mobility in Brazil, ba= sed on tested actions, while fostering creativity and innovation due to par= ticularities from each city or country.

The work structure has three main stages. In the first= , the methodology of analysis is addressed, as well as the description of t= he case study city used to validate the research problem. The second stage = refers to an institutional analysis of urban transportation in Brazil, cons= idering legal and governance aspects and an example of these aspects for th= e municipal scale using the case study city. The final analysis stage sets = measures aiming to overcome urban mobility issues, contextualizing measures= implemented in other countries.

2. MATERIAL AND METHODS

Methodologically, this paper is based on a review of t= he literature, and research of current legislation in Brazil and exemplifyi= ng for municipal level case of study: Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA, Santa Catarin= a State, Brazil. The literature reviewed includes public documents such as = legislation and research which investigate transport management, its ineffi= ciencies, financial sustainability, contracts types, etc. These documents p= rovide relevant knowledge of the situation in country-wise, allowing draw a= legal-institutional diagnostic of the urban transportation in the country.= Secondary, literature has been used to outline international schemes and m= odels of transport management, transit funding, urban planning, and active = transport.

In assessing whether different schemes and models can = be used in different countries, there is initially an element of understand= ing regarding Brazilian institutional and legal framework. This analysis wa= s permeated with comparisons of the legal application for the case study ci= ty, in order to understand the thread of practical consequences to users an= d its negative externalities.

The use of a municipal case study becomes essential to= correlate legal and institutional aspects that are correlated, complement = each other, and sometimes, occurs regulatory overlap on the ground that giv= ing administrative agencies overlapping jurisdiction and leads to duplicati= ve or conflicting regulation which is inefficient and unduly burdensome (AAGAAR= D, 2011). This appraisal allows to precisely identify the points of ine= fficiencies. In a final moment, it was listed alternatives solutions for th= e inefficiencies of the transportation system in Brazilian cities. These we= re obtained through general successful and recognized experiences in other = countries using literature as guidance, as emphasises Buehler et al. (2017= ) about the patent success of urban mobility of cities that adopted success= ful policies from others cities. However, regarding necessary adaptations a= nd different institutional and legislative characteristics.

2.1 Case study city: Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA,= Brazil

The case study municipality, Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA, h= as 145.796 inhabitants (BRAZIL, 2020) located in southern Brazil. Historic= ally, Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA has tourism as one of its main economic and so= cial aspects, having a great seasonal variation of population, especially d= ue to summer season. According to data from the Municipal Authority (PMBC, = 2017), Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA receives more than 3 million tourists annuall= y, reaching a peak of around 800.000 tourists in January. The city integrat= es an economic hub with a high tourist flow and related economy (BRAZIL, 20= 15; 2016).

Such factors associated with public transport that doe= s not meet the demands of the population (PMBC, 2014; PMBC, 2018a) reduce= the mobility of the population and enhance the manifestation of negative e= xternalities (e.g., traffic congestion, pollution, accidents). In this aspe= ct, it is worth mentioning that the participation of the public transit in = the modal share is about 7%; been reported by the Municipal Authority as a = poor condition of public transit services with low productivity (PMBC, 2014; = 2018a).

Conversely, Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA has the highest dem= ographic density in the Santa Catarina State, and, although this could be a= decisive factor to make transit feasible and thrive. Buehler et al. (2017= ) emphasizes that compact cities with mixed-use development generate many t= rips short enough to walk and cycling and placing locations with easy walki= ng distance for public transport. Although, it also can be a liability (as = in the case study city) once transit modal share is very low (Figure 1). Mo= reover, the high motorization rate (1,29 vehicles registered per household;= above the national average of 0,95 vehicles/household (IBGE, 2018b)), in = addition to the incident tourist flow is incompatible with the current capa= city of the road system. This leverages environmental and economic issues a= nd affect the quality of life of the population. Also, the municipality suf= fers from an accelerated migration process and the disordered urban sprawli= ng, pressure factors on urban mobility (POLLETTE; RAUCCI, 2003; TISCHER et al= ., 2013).

Figure 1.
Registration of vehicle flow in Balne=E1rio Cambor= i=FA
Sour= ce: the author.

The availability of public transport itineraries in th= e municipality of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA does not cover the entire urban ar= ea to provide good accessibility. As a result, services are limited in some= regions (mainly peripheric areas of the urban perimeter), reducing the acc= essibility of potential public transport users. Also, the system is not int= egrated with the inter-municipal system, reducing the attractiveness of tra= nsport, and access to other municipalities is a crucial factor for conurbat= ed regions (PMBC, 2018a). For these reasons, the problems of urban mobility= in the city are considered a great challenge to the city and region, and w= ith similar issues country-wise.

3. RESULTS

3.1 Institutional Overview Of Urban Transpor= t In Brazil

In order to understand the causes of the inefficiency = of the TUMS, it is essential to investigate the political-legal institution= al arrangement. The Brazilian population is currently experiencing a concep= tual change regarding economic models and strategies, which could better ac= hieve higher productivity on public provisions. State apparatus, historical= ly inefficient, highly interventionist, and centrally planning, has imputed= severe adverse effects to public services, including in the transport sect= or.

Urban problems are commonly associated with planning f= ailures, a term widely used to diagnostics urban misfortunes in Brazil. A f= ew times, however, it is conceptualized, and its cause-effect processes are= in-deep analysed. Lack of planning is usually associated with the failure = of the central public authority (city, state or federal) to execute an prov= ide urban services; to achieve constitutional guarantees: the right to efficient urban mobility and the full development of the city's social functions and to guarantee t= he well-being of its inhabitants (Art. 144 and Art. 182 of the Brazi= lian Constitution (BRAZIL, 1988).

This planning should cover all spheres of urbanism, fr= om urban masterplans, paving, and street furniture, building codes and tran= sportation system planning, connections and intermodal, traffic planning an= d scheduling, resource allocation to priority areas, investments required w= orks, pricing, route, itinerary, tariff composition; in addition to tenderi= ng process; resource allocation for funding, quality goals and fairness in = services, balanced city occupation, and low user value (Art. 10 of Law 12.5= 87/2012 in BRAZIL (2012)), etc.

Problems arise from this, whereby, initially, the cent= ral authority (through political representatives and specialists/technician= s commission) would have the competence to satisfactorily determine all the= se parameters, in coordination with the other intersectoral policies of a c= ity; and all this to be carried out efficiently and capable of making publi= c transport competitive with private cars.

To enhance transit productivity and competitiveness an= d overcome the inequalities of urban transport mentioned above, it is neces= sary to understand the existence of intricate control system related to urb= an transport in Brazilian cities, which does not allow the best use of loca= l knowledge (HAYEK, 1945) and of the mechanisms to attend the needs of use= rs. This compromises the quality of public transit services, the infrastruc= ture (saturated with automobiles), and generate burdens that are borne by p= rivate entities, natural or legal person.

In Brazil, the opening for private participation in th= e provision of public services was consolidated by the Law of the regime of= concessions and provision of public services (Law 8.987/1995 in Brazil (1995<= /a>)), and the Law of Public-Private Partnerships - PPP (Law 11.079/2004 in= Br= azil (2004)). On the one hand, they have provided better possibilities = for the use of public resources; on the other hand, the need for a broad op= ening of competition is not yet solved, and the competition occurs only in = the bidding process, with the operation being an exclusive right of market = exploitation by the winning operator company (functional monopoly). As poin= t ed out by Jacobs (1984) this fact inhibits free enterprise mechanisms fr= om acting and experimenting solutions to urban problems (due to market rese= rve), which prejudice cities by suppressing what their economy can achieve = (JA= COBS, 1984).

The legal framework (in all spheres of government) imp= oses a highly regulated transport management structure that is inefficient,= and at the same time, limits competition. Associated with this, public mec= hanisms for quality control are insufficient, and place the burden on priva= te enterprises to mitigate potential impacts on urban traffic, with exclusi= ve counterparts from entrepreneurs (mitigating and pecuniary actions: in Ba= lne=E1rio Cambori=FA (BC) this is required by Complementary Law-BC 24/2018 = (PM= BC, 2018b), and in the environmental sector by the State Environment Au= thority), as observed in instruments such as environmental licensing and St= udies of Impacts on Neighborhood (SIN).

By limiting projects and the free initiative of indivi= duals in society, the burden is shifted to the population while keeping the= problem insoluble. The generally veiled cause lies in the complex Brazilia= n bureaucratic system, with excessive legislation and taxation issues, wide= spread political interference, and low capacity of public institutions.

As represented by Figure 2, these regulations fall on = transport users, who do not always have their needs met (efficient services= , comfort, safe, convenient, etc.) and therefore, having no option of exit = (to choose a competitor), other than for private use cars or individual pri= vate transport on demand.

The mechanisms of quality control for the resolution o= f problems by the public authority are mainly the surveillance (compliance = with contracts, tariffs, complaints from the population, etc.). Besides, co= mmonly, necessary improvements (e.g., fleet, frequency) require public subs= idies or increased value of the ticket to funding.

Figure 2.
Scheme of action of the institutional-legal proces= s on the urban transport users
Sour= ce: the author.

These consequences are observed throughout the Brazili= an municipalities to a greater or lesser degree, with difficulties in advan= cing improvements, mainly due to legal obstacles that do not allow the use = of the best solutions (laws that do not allow competition, low transport pr= oductivity, low institutional capacity, oligopoly service provider).

On the other hand, there is an increase in the use of = cars, directly promoted by the master plan that subsidizes the support of a= n increasing number of cars and investments in road infrastructure; and ind= irectly, where the automobile is the more viable alternative to meet the ne= eds of the population, in the face of the poor conditions of public transpo= rt. These factors will be further explored in the next topic.

3.2.1 Institutional and legal governance of urban t= ransport in Brazil

The current legal situation in Brazil expresses that t= he management of urban transport is currently the responsibility of the mun= icipal public authority, directly or indirectly (Art. 18 of Federal Policy = for Urban Mobility - PNMU (BRAZIL, 2012). In this sense, besides the alrea= dy evident limitations of public management of urban transport, a highly re= gulated system makes it difficult to improve productivity and make public t= ransit more appealing.

Public management is not necessarily the problem. Seve= ral examples of high levels of productivity and efficiency by public transp= ort management are evident in countries such as the United Kingdom, the Net= herlands, Germany, etc.² However, they operate under market pri= nciples, inside competitive logical frameworks through operating goals and = employee productivity.

This last factor, for instance, is one of the bottlene= cks of the low levels of efficiency of public services in the country (in g= eneral), by the insertion of stability of function (Federal Law of Civil Se= rvants: 8.112/1990 in Brazil (1990); and in municipal level by the Law: BC = 1.069/1991 in PMBC (1991)). In this sense, the acting of public authoritie= s is important, however, considering two caveats: the need for objective me= asurement of efficiency and competitiveness in the public services provisio= n and, simultaneously, not preventing the entry of private competition and = innovations.

As potential conflict resolution initiatives emerge th= e Brazilian bureaucratic establishment³ acts to regulate and in= tervene, creating barriers that hinder access to better services, which pre= clude competition between operators, penalizing entrepreneurs and the devel= opment of innovations. Apart from public transport, this can be evidenced i= n the recent regulation throughout the country, on individual transportatio= n (private on-demand transportation apps) and non-motorized (electric bicyc= le). In Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA this occurs by the law 4.040/2017 (PMBC, 201= 7) and decrees 9.444/2019 (PMBC, 2019a) and 9.413/2019 (PMBC, 2019b). For= the first case, the creation of requirements imposed by the aforementioned= municipal laws (Art. 6 of Law-BC 4.040/2017) demonstrates government inter= vention acting to increase the cost to drivers and users and reduce mobilit= y, exemplifying the counterproductive deviation of functions of the municip= al legislature.

For the second case, actions for inspection and regula= tion of the circulation of self-propelled bicycles (and the like) are alrea= dy provided for in the Brazilian Traffic Code (Law 9.503/1997 in Brazil (1997<= /a>)) and Contran Standard 465/2013 (BRAZIL, 2013); with no need for redu= ndant regulations. Other examples are the requirements of environmental lic= ensing and urban (e.g., Study of Impacts on Neigborhood - SIN), where they = also consider overlapping and redundant aspects required in different insti= tutions and laws, which make the process more expensive, increase the time = for analysis and do not properly address the cause of the problem. This non= -inaugural phenomenon has been pointed out by authors such as Banister and Butt= on (1991) where regulation generates a tendency to generate more regula= tion, starting simply and becoming more complex as it creates a chain of mi= ssed points that need more regulation. Also, consists of one entrance to co= rruption (CHIODELLI; MORONI, 2015).

Also noteworthy are the urban instruments at the munic= ipal level, the master plan, and the urban zoning. The master plan expresse= s important guidelines for urban growth, while zoning establishes differenc= es in building patterns and uses in different city locations, separated by = density control zones (high, medium and low-density zones), and by uses (co= mmercial activities, services, entertainment, governmental, non-governmenta= l and industrial), as well as encouraging uses (e.g., gastronomy, vocationa= l uses).

The Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA zoning guidelines (Law-BC 2= .794/2008 in PMBC (2008)) involve, for example, clearance height for areas= located in the first two blocks near the sea (ZACC zones) and tighter heig= ht control for other areas, acting as a density control. Eerdmans et al. (2010= ) points out that the lack of coordination between public transport dev= elopment and spatial planning leads to a situation where spatial density va= ries greatly, with areas where effective public transport is only viable to= the tangential limit of dense areas, reducing the quality of service and t= he potential market for public transport. The Master Plan also establishes = controls for basement, parking spaces, minimum lot, etc.

Moreover, the different rules created for different ar= eas of the city are often discretionary, which quickly makes the law obsole= te due to urban dynamics. This requires, in addition to special amendments,= costly revisions (in time and financial resources) pursuing social partici= pation and unsolvable and highly questionable consensus. This process gener= ates incredibility among the population, and, not infrequently, particular = groups of society dominate the decision-making process for their interests.=

In the Government Management Report (Brazilian Federal= Court of Accounts: Brazil (2018c)) it was pointed out that many municipal= ities reproduce identical texts of master plans from other ones, completely= disregarding local specificities. There is a tendency for the literal repe= tition of the instruments as described by the Federal Urban Policy law. And= most of the master plans are merely authoritative, lacking on local specif= ication, which also demonstrates the low technical capacity verified in mos= t local public authorities.

Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA's master plan, for example, has= been for over a decade without revision⁴, generating significa= nt conflicts in attempts to update. Public resources could be better direct= ed at efforts to promote a more robust urban code that only aims to regulat= e factors of discomfort (negative externalities), with equal rules for all,= not specified nor directed rules.

Thus, public planning should act less as an omniscient= city planner (especially as regulators), but instead, devote efforts to ma= intaining good market practices and enforcing property rights and free ente= rprise (MORONI, 2015). Thus, according to the analogy of Jacobs (2000), p= eople demand healthy standards for sewage treatment, but it would be unwise= to standardize methods to achieve this result, and which by definition, wo= uld limit better methods to be developed. Nevertheless, the public authorit= ies should provide services in specific cases that cannot be met by the pri= vate sector or, when necessary, by infrastructure (e.g., railway, highways,= waterways, maintenance).

Kle= in et al. (1997) exemplify that as long as transport operators do not e= xceed the property rights of others, they should be allowed to operate unim= peded. With the rights restriction system reasonable implemented, the marke= t process starts to operate, generating real competition and the discovery = of new opportunities (entrepreneurial and innovation) applied to the partic= ularities of local conditions.

In this sense, the inefficiencies of urban transport a= re less a problem of lack of investments than of creating the legal and ins= titutional conditions for solutions to be tested, proposals presented and, = in turn, resources to be invested, either privately or with public counterp= arts. Bringing again to the example of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA, just as the = municipality makes concessions proposals, mainly for tourism area (e.g., na= utical and real estate developments, leisure and waterfront complex, etc.),= it could make calls for investments in mobility, especially for large-scal= e projects.

Such financing strategies may be extended to other for= ms of investment (despite the limits of competition)⁵, such as = the various categories of concessions (especially PPP), mechanisms for capt= uring the increasing price of land/properties resulting from investments. T= hese can also be combined, as proposed by Paranaiba (2015) to create a vir= tuous cycle of investments in urban mobility including shareholder financin= g (including property owners), bond issuance, etc. Also, the existence of f= inancing from tax revenues such as bettermen taxes, congestion charges, par= king fees, etc (more examples in Medda (2012); Litman (2014); Olsen and Fear= nley (2014); Paranaiba (2015)).

Among the main criticisms of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA's = public transportation are the lack of efficient user communication system, = real-time tracking, application, etc. According to technical analyses of th= e 2014 Municipal Director Plan (PMBC, 2014), and endorsed by the diagnosis= of the Municipal Plan of Urban Mobility (BC, 2018), public transport in th= e municipality has been declining, underutilized by the population. This is= due to problems such as inadequate itineraries; low productivity and inade= quate vehicles in the face of demand; lack of user information; confusing r= outes; long travel times; lack of credibility among the population, etc.

From a temporal perspective, the transport concessiona= ire in Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA, although the recent changed in the operator = concession (the contract was terminated by the concessionaire: Decree 10.12= 3/2020), the transport company has been in operation since 2006. However, a= s the Municipal Authority adjudges the service for the provider, the conces= sionaire has to respond to his contractor. Thus, not directly to the user, = which can hinder the quality of the services.. Data from recent years show = that there has been a stabilization in the number of passenger=92s ridershi= p, and more recently, a decrease in passengers ridership⁶.

For the European Union, long-term contracts can genera= te a market foreclosure for a longer period, thus diminishing the benefits = of competitive pressure. To minimise distortions of competition, and protec= t the quality of services, public service contracts should be of limited du= ration, while the extension of such contracts could be subject to positive = confirmation from users (JOUE, 2007).

Overall, the implementation of improvements to public = transport in the municipality of Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA can be considered l= imited, restricting to the updating part of the fleet in recent years, and = changing the concessionaire on emergency basis. However, following the rest= ructuring of routes and frequencies, the concession of urban transport does= not require a financial subsidy, which is a positive point.

Even so, the needs of the population are not completel= y met, with low levels of productivity, efficiency, comfort, and convenienc= e of public transport. Public transit service is not enough to compete with= cars. Also, public planning foster to accommodate increasing numbers of ca= rs in the city creates a vicious circle where there is no opening or opport= unities for improvement in crucial points of urban mobility. While regulato= ry instruments such as tariffs, itineraries and the impossibility of entry = (competition) are used to provide alternatives to users (unsatisfied users = may resort to competitor service).

The evolution in the use of public transportation (use= rs/trips) does not keep up with the rapid growth of the population and, con= sequently, of the vehicle fleet (Figure 3). The Urban Population Mobility S= urvey (NTU, 2017) identify that immediately after people have the opportun= ity to leave public transport, they will own their private individual car, = aiming more convenience, comfort and optimization of their time.

In Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA effects of car ownership are= potentiated by the synergistic effects of the high tourist flow throughout= the year. Notwithstanding, active transport in the municipality presents a= more favourable scenario (investments in accessibility, cycling infrastruc= ture, sidewalks, signalization, and public safety). The cycling system, for= example, covers a representative part of urban main roads, trying to meet = the growing demand of the population.

Bicycle transport also has advantages in the municipal= ity due to favourable topographic conditions and investments in lane covera= ge (= Figure 4). Its use can be enhanced by expanding the extension of lanes = strategically implemented on main roads, investments in safety, intermodal = with public transport, secure parking, etc.

Fig= ure 3.
Timeline of regulatory milestones, demographics, t= ransportation and impacts
Data= Source: Fleet;Detran/SC (2018); Population (IBGE, 2018b); Cycling infrastructure: (TISCHER, 2017); Transit ri= dership (PMBC, 2017c).

Figure 4.
Bicycle flow record during peak hours in Balne=E1= rio Cambori=FA
Sour= ce: the author.

3.2.2 Strategic overview for Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA=

While on the one hand the mobility conditions in the m= unicipality (and region-wise) tend to worsen, considering the current mobil= ity demographic trends in the municipality (density, exponential rates of m= igration to the region, mass tourism, growing fleet); on the other hand, th= e existing urban instruments in the municipality foster such a scenario, an= d in a way, ensure the maintenance of the current economic dynamism in the = short and medium-term. However, in the long-term, considering a hypothetica= l trend scenario, it can threaten this dynamism, increasing urban problems.= This phenomenon has been recurrent in Brazil's transportation planning, wh= ere public authorities, attempting to solve issues, end up generating a new= one (BERNARDES, 2019).

The benchmark of successful urban mobility practices w= orldwide demonstrates that, regardless of modes of transport, urban charact= eristics, climate, and socio-cultural conditions, effective and attractive = public transport is the conditio sine qua non for solving/mitigating urban = mobility problems. Its efficient consists precisely in congregate a large g= roup of people under a limited territorial unit, centres of generation and = concentration of employment.

Well-structured public transport is an unequivocal fou= ndation for action to reduce dependency and dominance of private cars, and = to contribute to increased rates of active transport travel, improved econo= mic competitiveness of the city, and well-being of the population, and ther= efore of a sustainable city, especially in large or dense cities.

Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA, being a very compact city (wit= h relatively high demographic density and commercial decentralization) has = the main factors in favour of an efficient and competitive urban public tra= nsport system. Moreover, this condition requires the adoption of integrated= strategies, considering systemic criteria into account as: inter-municipal= solutions, and an institutional-political condition that allows the possib= ility of entrance of solutions and alternatives according to the user's nee= ds.

Demographic density is a critical factor to the succes= s of urban transport in Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA. However, it is important to= reiterate that this urban condition also causes a geometric limitation on = city's road system, possibly being the most critical challenge within spati= al related, especially in central areas of the municipality. A reform of th= e urban transportation system would necessarily require a decision to choos= e between lane sharing (current use, which maintains flows bottlenecks); or= priority for transit (it would be necessary to implement an exclusive lane= for bus and/or Light Rail Vehicles).

Transport infrastructures should be designed as facili= tators, to ensure sound spatial coordination of land uses and transport inf= rastructures to create a physical environment for low-income families to im= prove their economic condition. Thus, planners and policymakers can ensure = that the development/extension of an urban transport line is better leverag= ed by supporting policies for mixed-use development and not fostering low-d= ensity urban uses (EWING et al., 2016).

Cycling infrastructure also should be improve, as it i= s has an important function for mobility. As evidenced by Tischer and Polette = (2019), the bicycle is the third most used mode of displacement in the = municipality, accounting for about 9.4% of vehicle flow and 5.9% of urban t= ravel.

It is noteworthy that is no need for large volumes of = reduction in vehicle flows to reduce environmental impacts and reduce traff= ic congestion (European Commission, 2004). From this, small gains in reduc= ing dependency on private cars can result in significant time savings in tr= affic, reduced congestion peaks, reduced fuel consumption, pollution, noise= , and so on. Thus, in sequence will be considered possible actions/guidelin= es aimed at making public transport more attractive and reduce dependence o= n cars.

3.2.3 Lessons from Other Countries

The main challenge to o improves urban mobility and re= duce unwilling impacts (e.g., air pollution, noise, accidents, fuel consump= tion, delay time, etc.), is to enhance accessibility on urban transport ser= vices, in order to reduce dependence on private cars in favour of transit, = as well as active transport.

From this, the implementation involves structural and = non-structural actions. The former refers to transport infrastructure and u= rbanism; and the second involves policies (e.g., revision of legislation, e= liminating discretionary regulations, encouraging inventiveness and partici= pation of private entities, designing contracts with effective quality cont= rol mechanisms).

Government, in this sense, should be a partner of priv= ate activity, supporting and overseeing the implementation of actions that = will impact the welfare of the population. However, it should act only in t= he provision of services in areas where provision costs cannot be recovered= by market practices.

Experiences across countries that have implemented the= se measures have not been linear, and so, are constantly being adjusted. In= this sense, this process is also about learning and validating different e= xperiences. The implementation of measures should be progressive, in as man= y steps as necessary, however, regarding adjustments and permanent feedback= of the process, starting from more basic actions to specific and correctio= n of eventual problems (Figure 5).

Figure 5.
Conceptual model of urban mobility improvement
Sour= ce: the author.

3.2. 3 Actions for transit system

As society evolves, and the limits of government actio= ns are controlled, the state should act only in the control of negative ext= ernalities and acts collaboratively to enhance positive outcomes, allowing = free initiative, innovation and the use of local knowledge in society.

According to the European Bank (2019), the reform pro= cess of urban transport must go through a Reform Plan predicting the scale = of it, phases of actions, speed of implementation, etc. This should enable = the government to prepare budget, legislation, and raise popular and legisl= ative support for the necessary changes. Initially, it should envisage rout= e optimization through travel pattern (origin-destination surveys). Secondl= y, the integration of services between modes, between city and regions, as = well as a differentiated tariff policy and other user attraction strategies= , aiming at the convenience of users.

Considering public transport as central to the reforms= , they may also increase competition for routes (segmented routes or in cit= y zones) providing conditions for more participants in the tendering proces= s. Secondly, competition on route may be tested, but considering the proble= ms arising from a private operation on a public platform (streets) and stra= tegies to avoid conflicts and loss of services (prior registration of inter= ested companies, route plans, own stops, communication, etc.) (KLEIN, 2000= ; P= AREDES, 1992).

The combination of planning and oversight of the trans= port authority and competition between independent operators shows a positi= ve impact on the quality of services provided and the financial sustainabil= ity of operators. Therefore, the key to an efficient urban transport system= is well-designed contracts, tailored to market possibilities, with well-de= fined responsibilities and performance control mechanisms (definition of ri= sk and infrastructure regime, segmented or total area tendering, duration o= f the contract, communication and promotion, etc.). Another fact that prove= s to be efficient is the segmented tendering, by urban zones, with contract= s differentiated by location, with risk division for areas with higher dema= nd and with risks borne by the government in areas of low density or demand= .

Transport operations may be performed by public, priva= te or hybrid companies. It is fundamental, however, that public operations = occur within competitive market conditions under the same circumstances as = private companies (Figure 6). This guarantees certain exclusivity for opera= tors who successfully congregate passengers: by the quality of the services= , judged by the customer, the passenger.

In this sense, G=F3mez-Lobo and Briones (2014) reiter= ates that contracts should provide operators with incentives to meet demand= and be evaluated by performance indicators, at least of operating variable= s (e.g., seat-kilometre), as observed in most of the countries of Europe, N= orth America, Australia, and even Latin America as the case of Santiago. Th= e service contract should be designed for the particularities of the city, = providing incentives for enhance productivity and transit ridership.

Figure 6.
Principal responsibilities of public and private s= ector for the transportation sector
Sour= ce:European Bank (2019).

In addition to this, it was highlighted positive exper= iences that can provide valuable guidelines for augmentation productivity o= f public transportation in Brazil. The London case, for example, cites the = following reference actions (more examples in G=F3mez-Lobo and Briones (2014); Preston and Almutairi (2013); Velde and Wallis (2013):

Government plans routes, frequencies, fares, and tariff zones, type of v= ehicles, advertising, infrastructure, intermodal and zoned crossings;
The operator provides vehicles, stopping stations and garage;
Operation network (routes) area divided into city zones (including the m= etropolitan area); The itineraries can be separated into blocks that can be= tender separately or in groups, aiming at greater competitiveness of compa= nies entering the market and also, allows the entry of small operators; Mor= e participants in the bidding process have been found to reduce the operati= ng cost, and therefore it is important to make the transportation system ef= ficient that there is a real market for contracts.
Routes are tender individually or in route packages, but participants ma= y bid for several/all; about 20% of the network is bid annually;
Gross cost, public withholding contracts, and operators are not at risk = for revenue but earn bonuses based on quality criteria.

Similar experiences are observed in the Scandinavian m= odel, with the exception that the government holds the depot provision (but= not the buses) and pay operators for kilometres operated plus incentive fo= r the quality of the service.

In Lithuania, for example, problems with urban transpo= rt (similar to those in Brazil: poor quality, unreliable transport, polluta= nts, no ticket and integration zones, commercial lobbying, etc.) motivate a= process of improvement in the country. This process involved surveys with = the population (definition and optimization of routes), setting of contract= ual conditions suited to the demands of the population, competitiveness wit= h public transport vehicles and implementation of integrated fare system (<= a href=3D"https://www.redalyc.org/journal/5863/586372340001/html/#B32">EURO= PEAN BANK, 2019).

In developing countries, however, special consideratio= n should be given to the political influence of companies that have a monop= oly that limits the scale and speed of any reforms, such as broader changes= in the hiring of bus services (as is the case in Brazil). In these countri= es, institutions often have low capacity, legal systems are slow, access to= financial markets is limited, and budgetary resources for investments and = subsidies are scarce.

Germany, for example, has reconciled the need for cost= savings and improved attractiveness and quality of the transit service. Th= ese actions have given the country a very effective, competitive and financ= ially sustainable urban transport. It was highlighted the following (BUEHLER; = PUCHER, 2011):

Cost reduction: administrative organization, outsourcing, increased work= er productivity, cooperation agreements to share workers, infrastructure an= d inputs, research and organization of routes, reduction of entry cost of n= ew companies (deregulation);
Increased earnings: regional route coordination, regional fares, monthly= and annual discounted tickets, group-specific tickets, full pedestrian and= cyclist integration, urban development around transit, business competitio= n, coordination with long-distance routes, group and specific day discounts= , ticket automation, trip tracking and real-time itineraries (Real Time Inf= ormation - RTI);
Complementary policies: active transport, mixed and dense use, car-free = zones, traffic calming, increasing the cost for cars; reduction of travel t= imes, agreements between transit companies to buy at scale.

It is emphasized that communication is one of the key = factors for the success and improvement of the competitiveness of public tr= ansport. The adoption of regional route coordination strategies, real-time = travel monitoring, bus stop information, and full internet integration are = key to attracting new users and making transit attractive and competitive w= ith the car.

Equally important are actions aiming inter-municipal i= mprovement of the transport sector, given that cities are not hermetic stru= ctures, and expressive flow of people and goods circulates regionally. With= in strategic sector planning, urban transport must comprehend regional scal= e. Especially in large cities or conurbation urban areas, it is necessary t= o design consortium proposals. The non-commitment of one of the participati= ng municipalities could generates severe problems for both municipalities: = conflicts of jurisdiction, disproportionate regulation, a saturation of are= as of the city by commuting, decreases the effectiveness of public transpor= t and increases the motorization rate.

At the core of this equation invariably lie the strate= gic hubs for urban mobility (e.g., state capitals, large cities or companie= s, airports, heavy tourist or industrial cities). Regarding Balne=E1rio Cam= bori=FA city, it is important to highlight lack of competitive transit (pre= carious conditions of communication, predictability, comfort, competitive t= ime) to these mesoregional or micro-regional destinations.

Rail (or even waterway) transportation between these d= estinations can contribute directly to reducing congestion, both by gaining= passenger travel and reducing truck flow by cargo transportation. Although= limited explored in Brazil, the rail mode has, in general, has highly envi= ronmental benefits when compared to road transport, such as: lower pollutan= t emission and noise, higher energy efficiency; inducing economic benefits = such as real estate appreciation, revitalization of urban areas, high effic= iency and high acceptance by the population, which contributes greatly to r= educing dependence on cars (BOWES; ILANFELDT, 2001; CRAMPTON, 2003; LITMAN, 2= 013).Lanza (2020) emphasizes the importance of fostering the country's= railway system in a system of free competition in the sector. Boquet (2014) points out that several cities have found that they can increase their a= ttractiveness and the sustainability of transport by building a modern elec= tric transport system, with emphasis on LRV in the urban area.

And finally, it is important to consider the peak-hour= s (also related to commuting of population), a period in which concentrates= the largest volumes of traffic in a day. Therefore, in this period, there = are a great concentration of transit users and in the same, lack of frequen= cy of public transport. Reduce issues of public transit in peak-hours perio= d has complex resolution, and usually entails high costs and offers lower r= eturns, being a challenge for cities with high tourist flow, for example. F= or a company it is very costly to acquire assets compatible with the demand= s in this period, and most of the time, vehicles will be idle (CURRIE, 2016), and thus, deregulation (specifically opening up to competition) could s= ubstantially contribute to the improve the quality of the service in associ= ation with contractual arrangements for the entry of small competitors.

3.3.4 Considerations for active transportation

Public transport is enhanced and complemented by an ro= bust active transport system. Measures involve increasing the infrastructur= e coverage, build high standard cycle paths and pedestrian areas, with an u= rban aesthetic that encourages these displacements. It is highlighted the f= ollowing measures:

Implementation of cycling infrastructure on main roads, suppressing park= ing lots when necessary;

Implementation of safety signalization for cyclists and pedestrian;

Urban safety enhancements for pedestrians by reducing exposure, having p= edestrians and cyclists at the centre of urban planning;

Implementation of pedestrian/cyclist walkways between buildings, blocks,= under/over roadways, walkways, or skyways.

Creation of inter-municipal pedestrian and cycling paths/routes;

Expansion of off-street trails along rivers and green areas;

Strategic planning of cycle routes in the city, assessing inefficiencies= , based on cycling parameters of connectivity and fragmentation (𝛼,= 𝛽, 𝛾) (TISCHER, 2017);
Urban code fostering a compact city, focusing on controlling negative ex= ternalities rather than density controls, and problems such as city sprawl = and the manifestation of other urban impacts related;
Eliminate discretionary regulations;
Emphasizes urban aesthetics with good infrastructure, street furniture, = mixed-use, clear public-private property boundaries, street-facing building= facades, distance between buildings, etc.

3.2.5 Considerations for cars

In addition, aiming to increase the competitiveness of= other modes of transport against cars and achieve a balance between car us= e and other modes of transport, some specific actions may be adopted:

Restriction on car traffic in central areas of the city;
Measures to reduce maximum permitted speed in central residential areas = (traffic calming): curb length, chicanes, roundabouts, etc.;
Reduction of street parking in central areas in favour of cycling/pedest= rian infrastructure on main roads;
Encourage the use of underground parking in central areas, aiming not co= mpromising aesthetics quality of the city. Implementation of rotating parki= ng spaces with a system that adjusts the value by demand can increase avail= able parking spaces up to 14%, according to Shoup (2017).
Instead of compulsorily demanding the parking of projects, the municipal= ity may charge a compatible fee, making parking facultative for buildings.<= /p>
Restrain above-ground parking for building without indent. The facade is= critical. Large, blank facades facing the street should be avoided.
Appraise the implementation of a congestion charge, automobile taxes, an= d fuel for a long-term scenario.

However, due to the socio-economic conditions of the p= opulation and the high disparity in taxesxse= rvice provision (in developing countries) it is important that car restrain= t by means of charging (direct or indirect) does not occur before of a proc= esses of improvement in public transport (i.e., from the population having = an efficient alternative, convenient to their needs), aiming to avoid a hig= h social impact to the car users who do not have a quality public transport= substitute, increasing the cost of living.

Reducing the convenience of private cars can advance p= rogressively through simpler actions (paid rotative parking, restricted car= circulation and reduced speed at strategic locations, replacement of on-st= reet parking lanes for bike lanes) to even more complex actions (congestion= charges, fuel and vehicle tax increases, etc.).

3.2.6 Transport policy and legislation

The investigation of the legal framework allowed to id= entify specific subjects that may contribute significantly to a balance in = the demands and offers of the modes of transport in the case study municipa= lity, which can be extended to other municipalities in a country-wise persp= ective, through specific local adjustments.

It was suggested alterations in the legislation (or in= stitutional procedures for municipal issues), with the purpose on subtracti= ng laws that demand excess requirements, repealing redundant laws, implemen= ting laws unifying the understanding and regulating points not covered by t= he current legislation. The suggested changes are described below. Regardin= g the federal sphere, the following stand out:

The pacification of legal provisions by federal law regarding the legal= possibility for competition in urban transport services, allowing autonomy= for municipalities authorities experiment in terms of concession possibili= ties; Alteration of the tariff policy (Chapter II of the Federal Policy of = Urban Mobility), providing more freedom for the service provider to use mar= ket knowledge, define ticket fares, explore other possibilities and use cre= ativity to improve the quality of the services provided, etc.;
Autonomy of local authorities to implement specific concession schemes (= e.g., greater or lesser deregulation, centralization or divide the city int= o districts). This includes the competence to form specific contracts with = service providers (e.g., number of operators to provide the service, defini= tion of contract length, type of cost contract, condition for registering o= n-street competitors, etc.);
Following the regulation of the European Commission (EC-EU: 1370/2007) t= he competent authority (or the group of competent authorities) that provide= integrated public passenger transport services, collectively or through it= s members, should exercise the necessary control, however, guarantee a fair= competition condition (JOUE, 2007).
Related to this, there is a need to enhance the competitiveness of the p= ublic sector, to improve the institutional capacity of public authorities. = The initial step is the insertion of the work regime of public servants int= o a more competitive regime, eliminating the stability of the function give= n by Art. 21 of Law 8.112/1990 (BRAZIL, 1990).

Concerning legal/institutional changes in the scope of= local authorities, the following actions are exemplified for the case stud= y city Balne=E1rio Cambori=FA:

Master Plan: elimination of urban indexes and the compulsory need for pa= rking spaces in developments; the regulations contained in the Master Plan = should use negative law nature to guarantee equal rules for all, to reduce = discretionary and political logrolling;
Elimination of municipal laws regarding the provision of alternative non= -motorized transport (e.g., bicycles) and the provision of on-demand transp= ortation services (app services). The regulations for these issues are alre= ady covered by the Brazilian Traffic Code, Ministry of Infrastructure Regul= ations, Civil Law and Criminal Code;
It is necessary to correct points regarding the overlap between state le= gislation (Environmental licensing studies) with municipal studies (Neighbo= urhood Impact Study - SIN). The converging points between these studies mus= t be unified, aiming to reduce costs, bureaucracy and political interests. = Using the SIN as a reference, it should be removed aspects already contempl= ated by environmental licensing procedures, in addition to making explicit = the public counterpart, instead of demanding one-way counterparts from the = entrepreneur.
Contracts of concession of public transport services: Establishment of s= pecific contracts for each concession situation that best suits local issue= s; establish payment mechanisms linked to the quality of services; allow gr= eater tacit freedom for operators to be defined in specific contracts; grea= ter publicity for transparency in the bidding process; establish appropriat= e safeguards to concessions where the introduction of regulated competition= between operators leads to more attractive and innovative services at lowe= r cost and is not likely to obstruct the performance of the specific tasks = assigned to public service operators (JOUE, 2007); Implement mechanisms to= favour the turnover of service providers, eliminating requirements that on= ly favour the entry of large companies; and avoid long-term contracts of co= ncessions (the extension of long contracts could be subject to positive con= firmation from users).

CONCLUSION

When Jane Jacobs (JACOBS, 1970) points out that exter= nalities such as pollution, noise, and congestion do not come from society'= s progress but its stagnation. That is, in a dynamic society where free ent= erprise and local knowledge are actively acting, problems and discomforts a= re more quickly neutralized. Individuals can openly coordinate their action= s to provide solutions and the innovation freely operates.

The transport system as an elementary system of the pr= ocess of life organization in society will always be high interest of the p= opulation, as it is an elementary need for the performance of social and ec= onomic functions of individuals. The solution will derive from diffuse sour= ces, probably from particular innovations, much more sensitive to the speci= fic needs of the population than central authorities. If these have a persp= ective of objective improvement in the population's quality of life, they s= hould be supported by the government.

The results of the present study made it clear that th= e most fruitful way to contribute to the improvement of urban mobility is t= he assimilation, by both technicians/scientists and planners/governors, of = the inexorable limitations imposed by the impracticability of public manage= ment to possess all information necessary for proper centralized/coordinate= d governance. Therefore, the various peculiarities cannot be brought togeth= er into one plan. On the contrary, experiments should be allowed, which may= spontaneously elect the ones that best benefit the individual demands of a= particular city.

In this sense, Pennington (2011) emphasizes that the = best way for a country to emerge from poverty and prosperity is to develop = a set of robust formal institutions followed by a gradual process of evolut= ion of social norms and conventions (the so-called = informal institutions: private property, free market, rule of law), = with the best chance of respecting and correcting human imperfections that = threaten to destabilize the system and lead to unfavourable outcomes.

Since it is not possible (and desirable) to paralyze = productive activities and impose preferences of the means of transportation= to be adopted by individuals, the role of public urban planning would be, = so only, to foster the adoption of mobility solutions and competition and t= o ensure that they occur within the principles of ethics and transparency.<= /p>

Legislative agents (Municipality, State or Federal), i= n turn, should place more emphasis on surveillance, ensuring access to the = rights and freedom, instead of creating legal obstructions that hinder citi= zens' lives and possible solutions to urban problems. Public agents play a = key role in inspection, verifying the proper= use of public money and monitoring regional demands in the city.

Therefore, it follows that the scope of mobility studi= es and urban planning should not occur within a rigid central planning proc= ess, but rather to pursue the prosperity of cities as the final objective. = It has to consider the complexity and diversity of uses, meeting the needs = of users within a framework of efficiency, competitiveness and financial su= stainability of transit system.

This should not necessarily exclude the car use. Howev= er, it is about balancing the offers and demands of different modes of tran= sport able to provide effective alternatives for users. Therefore, as the e= mphasis of urban mobility shifts to transit and active transport, the urban= mobility conflicts generated by private cars' dependence will be reduced, = as well as the reduction of economic and socio-environmental impacts, which= becomes a consequence of a more sustainable urban mobility process.

By the present investigation, it was identified points= that can contribute to improve urban mobility and reduce urban externaliti= es in the case study city, such as: driving the attention on public transpo= rt framework, improving the institutional capacity of the local authority i= n order to eliminate redundant regulations/ unnecessary requirements and th= e firmament of more specific and robust concession contracts.

However, the creation of conditions for improvement al= so depends on changes in federal laws, in particular, the pacification of l= egal provisions aiming at greater autonomy of local authorities for experim= entation. That is, granting more freedom for the service provider to use th= e knowledge of the transport market, defining tariffs, mechanisms for attra= cting new users, and at the same time, establish more effective regulations= and based on quality criteria, etc.

Finally, the present work can contribute to transport = and urban mobility improvement discussion in Brazil, subsiding the decision= -making process to allowing solutions to be implemented, using strategies t= he use the best knowledge available, and that the contract design and the m= echanisms of quality control could be robust: accurate, specific and effect= ive.

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Notes

2 Importantly, greater autonomy of states and = municipalities in these countries allows for more freedom of experimentatio= n and possibilities, which are limited in a centralized federative pact mod= el such as that of Brazil.

3 Concept envisioned by Faoro (1979), definin= g bureaucratic establishment as development = of centralized institutional and political structures, in a constant adapta= tion to the mechanisms of continuity and permanence in the political struct= ures of a society.

4 Current Director Plan was promulgated in 200= 6 and the zoning in 2008. According to the City Statute Law, these plans ha= ve to be updated at least every 10 years.

5 The provision of public services by private = entities are provided for in Art. 37/XXI (regulated by Law 8.666/1993: Brazil, = 1993) and Art. 175 of the constitution (regulated by Law 8.987/1995: Brazi= l, 1995) and the Law 11.079/2004: Brazil, 2004 (Public-Private Partner= ship) and guarantees of payments given by the Budget Law 2016-2019 (Law 13.= 707/2018 in Brazil (2018d)).

6 Tariffs prices are defined by the municipal = government (law 9.211/2018c: PMBC, 2018).

Notes

1 Engenheiro Ambiental, Doutor em Ci=EAncia e= Tecnologia Ambiental pela Universidade do Vale do Itaja=ED com =EAnfase em= mobilidade urbana e transportes no Transport Research Institute - TRI/Edin= burgh Napier University/ Reino Unido. Atualmente desenvolve consultoria p= =FAblica e privada, e pesquisas t=E9cnicas e acad=EAmicas nas =E1reas de tr= afego urbano aplicados a avalia=E7=E3o de impactos ambientais e socioecon= =F4micos, al=E9m de pol=EDticas e infraestruturas de transporte sustent=E1v= eis aplic=E1veis a realidade brasileira. E-mail: viniciustischer@hotmail.co= m.